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CASE NOTES
but the desirability of putting an end to the conduct involved in mala
prohibita offenses is not so pressing as to disregard the individual's rights.
The right of a society to restrict individual liberty can only be justified by
a compelling social necessity. There exists no such social necessity which
would require the imprisonment of individuals for conduct which is not
deemed reprehensible and which is not known to be prohibited.
ESCHEAT-POSSIBLE MULTIPLE LIABILITY OF ABAN-
DONED INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Appellant, Western Union Telegraph Company, is a New York cor-
poration, having its principal office in that state. It also does business in
all other states, the District of Columbia, and in many foreign countries.
Besides its telegraphic message system, the company operates a tele-
graphic money order business. This latter service consists of accepting
money for telegraphic transmission in the office nearest the sender to the
office nearest the payee. The delivery of such money, given in the form of
a negotiable draft, cannot always be made. It also happens that the send-
ing office cannot, in every instance, make a refund to the sender. This
money builds up in bank deposits all over the country. It is this specific
property that the State of Pennsylvania seeks to escheat-in particular,
the amount of money held by the company for money orders bought in
that state.'
The courts of Pennsylvania declared the funds escheated, stating that
since their decree was naturally subject to the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution, Western Union need not fear that the
funds involved would be subject to double escheat in another state. They
brushed aside all other contentions of the company.2 In reversing the
1 The pertinent portion of the Pennsylvania statute reads as follows:
"(b) Whensoever the owner, beneficial owner of, or person entitled to any real or
personal property within or subject to the control of the Commonwealth or the where-
abouts of such owner, beneficial owner or person entitled has been or shall be and
remain unknown for the period of seven successive years, such real or personal prop-
erty, together with the rents, profits, accretions and interest thereof or thereon, shall
escheat to the Commonwealth subject to all legal demands on the same.
"(c) Whensoever any real or personal property within or subject to the control
of this Commonwealth has been or shall be and remain unclaimed for the period of
seven successive years, such real or personal property, together with the rents, profits,
accretions and interest thereof or thereon, shall escheat to the Commonwealth, subject
to all legal demands on the same." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 333 (1958).
2 The company contended that such a judgment of escheat rendered in a Pennsyl-
vania court would not protect it from the judgments of other states seeking to escheat
the same funds. They further asserted that the senders of the money orders and holders
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Pennsylvania judgment, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
it was unnecessary to answer the company's contentions since there was a
far more important question raised by the record-whether the state court
had power at all to render a judgment of escheat which would bar New
York or any other state from escheating the same property. Unless Penn-
sylvania had the power to protect the company against other claims, in-
cluding the State of New York,8 who in turn claimed the obligations
were within their own jurisdiction, the judgment denied Western Union
due process of law. In addition, the potential multi-state claims to the res,
which is the subject of the escheat, make it not unlikely that various states
will claim in rem jurisdiction over it.4 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Com-
inonwealth of Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
At early common law, escheat was an incident of feudal law, whereby
a fee reverted to the lord when the tenant died without leaving a succes-
of negotiable drafts would not be bound by the Pennsylvania judgment since the service
by publication did not, for two reasons, give the state court jurisdiction: (1) that under
the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), the presence of property, called
a "res" within the state is a prerequisite for service by publication and that these obli-
gations did not constitute such property within Pennsylvania, and (2) that the notice by
publication did not give sufficient information or afford sufficient likelihood of actual
notice to meet due process requirements. In addition, the company urged that there
were possible escheats of other states which would not be bound by the Pennsylvania
judgment because they were not and could not be made parties to that proceeding.
3 The applicable part of the New York statute reads as follows:
1. Any amount held or owing by any organization other than a banking organization
for the payment of a travelers check or money order on which such organization is
directly liable, sold by such organization on or after January first, nineteen hundred
thirty, which shall have been outstanding for more than fifteen years from the date of
its sale, shall be deemed abandoned property. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 1309 (McKinney
1944).
(b) Any amount paid by a consumer or subscriber to such a corporation in advance
or in anticipation ofutility services furnished or to be furnished by such corporation
which in fact is not furnished, after deducting any sums due to such corporation by
such consumer or subscriber for utility services in fact furnished, which shall have re-
mained unclaimed by the person or persons appearing to be entitled thereto for five
years after the termination of the utility services for which such amount was paid in
advance or in anticipation, or, if during such period utility services are furnished by
such corporation to such consumer or subscriber and such amount is applied to the
payment in advance or in anticipation of such utility services, for five years after the
termination of such utility services. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 400 (McKinney 1944).
In construing this statute, the New York Attorney General, ten years before the West-
ern Union case arose, stated that the particular intangible personal property herein in-
volved was subject to escheat by the State of New York since that state was the domi-
cile of the company. 1950 Rep. Atty. Gen. 130, 131.
4 In fact, New York had already seized and escheated part of the funds claimed by
Pennsylvania. To this, the Pennsylvania trial court stated: "We take this opportunity
of stating that we do not recognize New York's authority to escheat that money, but
since it has been done we have no jurisdiction over this sum." 73 Dauphin County Rep.
160, 173 (1958).
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sor qualified to inherit under the original grant. Hence, the lapsing of
land to the Crown or to the lord of the manor, on the death of the owner
intestate without heirs.5 The doctrine was limited to real property and it
was an incident of tenure which related back to the right of the lord to
take for want of a tenant.6 It denoted a determination of the tenure by
some unforeseen contingency, in which case the land naturally resulted
back, as a reversion, to the original grantor or lord of the fee. In this
country escheat in the feudal sense existed in a few of the early colonies,
but in such sense it has not prevailed since the revolution and escheat is
now very generally regulated by statute.7 Escheat is an attribute of sov-
ereignty and rests on the principle of the ultimate ownership by the state
of all property within its jurisdiction. 8
The doctrine of bona vacantia, at common law, applied to abandoned
personal property9 and gave the sovereign the right to appropriate it,
hence, the doctrine of escheat did not apply to personal property.10 To-
day, the word escheat has outgrown its restricted meaning under the old
English feudal system and now includes personal property as well as land,
and is regarded as an incident of sovereignty, not of tenure."
At present, more than three-quarters of the states have some sort of
unclaimed personal property legislation. Comprehensive statutes reaching
virtually all types of personal property, including intangibles, have been
with us, with the exception of Pennsylvania,' 2 for less than twenty years. 13
52 The Oxford English Dictionary, 284, 285 (1933).
6 3 HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (3rd ed., 1923).
7 30 C.J.S. Escheat § 1 (1942); FISKE, CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 150, 155
(1890); BASSETT, Landholding in North Carolina, 11 L.Q. REV. 154, 155.
8 Ibid.
9 1 B1. Comm. 299.
10 Massachusetts S.P.C.A. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 339 Mass. 216, 158
N.E.2d 487 (1957); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); 3 HOLDS-
WORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 495 (1926).
11 Estate of Payne, 208 Wis. 142, 242 N.W. 553 (1932); In Re Lindquist's Estate, 25
Cal.2d 697, 154 P.2d 879 (1944).
12 The scope of the Pennsylvania statute included dividends and shares of stock as far
back as 1915.
13 Ely, Escheats: Perils &1 Precautions, 15 Bus. Law. 791, 792 (1960); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
9944-351 to 44-378 (1956); Ark. Stat., 50-601 to 50-612 (1947); Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 32,
553-56 to 3-76 (1958); Ky. Rev. Stat. c. 393 (1959); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 200A, §§ 1-17
(1955); Mich. Stat. Ann. § §26.1053 (1) to 26.1053(66) (1953); N.J.S.A. 2A: 37-11 to
2A: 37-44 (1946); N.Y. Abandoned Prop. Law, §§ 101-1502 (1944); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 116-120 to 116-126 (1952); O.R.S. §§ 98.302 to 98.436 (1957); 27 Purdon's Pa. Stat.
Ann. §§ 241-301 (1958); Utah Code Ann., 78-44-1 to 78-44-28 (1953); Wash. R.C.,
63,28.010 to 63,28.920 (1955); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann., par. 58-8-8 (1960); Laws of
Mont., Title 67, ch. 1, § 67-102 (28); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann., 5 22-203 (1945).
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The issue has often been raised as to whether an action of escheat is in
rem or in personam. Previous Supreme Court decisions have established
that the preceding is in rem or at least quasi in rem.' 4 Jurisdiction over
the res may be obtained by personal service upon the holder and service
by publication upon the obligee.' 5 Two essentials of jurisdiction, in such
a proceeding, are the seizure of the res and reasonable notice and an op-
portunity to be heard.16
Because the various state escheat statutes today include intangible per-
sonal property,' 7 the problem in the Western Union case, arises as to the
situs of such property. Since we have concluded that such an action is in
rem, all states having a reasonable interest in the particular property in-
volved could claim the situs of such in their own jurisdictions, thereby
giving themselves the authority to adjudicate the irghts to such property.
Judge Cardozo, in Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co.,
stated the rule as follows:
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times when
justice or convenience requires that a legal situs be ascribed to them. The
locality selected is for some purposes, the domicile of the creditor; for others,
the domicile or place of business of the debtor, the place, that is to say, where
the obligation was created or was meant to be discharged; for others, any place
where the debtor can be found [cases omitted]. At the root of the selection
is generally a common sense apprasial of the requirements of justice and con-
venience in particular conditions.' 8
In most instances, the established rule has been that the situs of intangible
personal property is the domicile of the owner.19
In the Western Union case, the Supreme Court recognized the possi-
bility of the various claims of several states. Consider the very logical ar-
guments that could be made by each of the following states that the situs
14 Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S 282 (1923); Anderson Nat'l Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Northwestern Clearance Co. v. Jennings, 106 Ore. 291,
210 Pac. 884 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
15 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S.
356 (1915); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
16Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). This was a proceeding to
compel the bank to pay over inactive bank accounts to the State of California. The
Court hcld the action as in personam so far as concerns the bank and quasi in rem
so far as concerns the depositors.
17 ELY, Escheats: Perils & Precautions, 15 Bus. Law. 791, 793-94 (1960) illustrates the
extent of intangible personalty which is today subject to escheat.
18255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
19 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U.S. 586 (1930); Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Pennington
v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Chicago, R.I.R.R. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710
(1899).
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of the funds was in their particular jurisdiction: (1) the state of incor-
poration of the holder (New York); (2) the state in which the money
orders were purchased (Pennsylvania); (3) the state in which the recipi-
ent was presumed to have been located; and (4) the state where the fiscal
agent where the money orders were drawn.
Since the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution does
not require any state to recognize and enforce the judgments of any sister
state where the forum state determines that the situs state had no jurisdic-
tion over the property; it is evident that all of the above mentioned states,
and perhaps more, would seek to escheat such funds for their own reve-
nue purposes. 20 Therefore, as the Supreme Court indicated, due process
of law would be violated by any one particular state's judgment escheat-
ing the property in question unless such judgment could prevent the pos-
sibility of other states escheating the same property. As was concluded in
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,21 when a state court's jurisdiction pur-
ports to be based, as here, on the presence of property within the state,
the holder of such property is deprived of due process of law if he is
compelled to relinquish it without assuranc that he will not be held liable
again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is not
bound by the first judgment.
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,22 under New Jersey's Escheat
Act,23 proceedings were instituted to escheat to the state certain personal
property, including unclaimed shares of the corporation's stock and un-
claimed dividends. Personal service was made on the appellant, and notice
identifying the property and the last-known owners was given by publi-
cation. Appellant was a New Jersey corporation but had no office or
place of business in the state except for a registered office. Over the com-
pany's objections to the validity of the proceedings under the federal
20 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343
(1942); U.S. CONST. ART. IV. For an interesting discussion of escheats and their revenue
aspects, see 35 Ky.L.J. 302 (1947).
21321 U.S. 233 (1944). 22 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
23 The New Jersey Escheat Act reads in part:
If any person, who, at the time of his death, has been or shall have been, the owner
of any personal property within this state, and shall have died, or shall die, intestate,
without heirs or known kindred, capable of inheriting the same, and without leaving
a surviving spouse, such personal property, of whatsoever nature the same may be, shall
escheat to the state. N.J. Star. Ann. 2A: 37-12 (1952).
Whenever the owner, beneficial owner, or person entitled to any personal property
within this state, has been or shall be and remain unknown for the period of fourteen
successive years, or whenever the whereabouts of such owner, beneficial owner or
person, has been or shall be and remain unknown for the period of fourteen successive
years, or whenever any personal property wherever situated has been or shall be and
remain unclaimed for the period of fourteen successive years, then, in any such event,
such personal property shall escheat to the State. N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A: 34-13 (1952).
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constitution, it was decreed that the unclaimed stock and dividends had
escheated to the state. In the opinion, however, the United States Su-
preme Court specifically stated that since the claim of no other state was
before the Court, determination of any right of a claimant state against
New Jersey for the property escheated by New Jersey must await pres-
entation to the court.24
There have been two other leading decisions by the Supreme Court
which have concluded that inactive bank deposits could escheat to the
state where the deposits were located, 25 and matured obligations of aban-
doned insurance policies could escheat to the state of residence of the in-
sured decedent.26 But, again, in both instances, the majority opinion re-
served the question of what another state, other than the one immediately
involved in the litigation, could do.27
In the Western Union case, the Court makes particular mention of the
fact that in controversies between states, the Supreme Court itself is the
proper tribunal where one of the states could file an original action.
Noting the great multiplicity of state escheat laws dealing with intangible
personal property as well as real property, Mr. Justice Black points out
that "(T)his makes it imperative that controversies between different
States ... be settled in a forum where all the States that want to do so
can present their claims for consideration and final, authoritative deter-
mination. Our Court has jurisdiction to do that."28 Relying on Texas v.
24 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, stated:
But if a state wishes to assert its right to escheat property which by its very nature
is not exclusively within its control, other interested states should be parties to the liti-
gation. The right to resort to this Court for adjustment of conflicting interests among
several states has been placed in the Constitution to avoid crude remedies of self-help
in the settlement of interstate controversies. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398. 341 U.S.
428, 444 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
25 Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
26 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). The Court held
contra, however, where insured persons, after delivery of the policies, ceased to be
residents of New York or where the beneficiaries were not residents of New York at
the maturities of the policies.
27 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Connecticut Mut. case
reads, in part, as follows:
How the conflicting interests of the States should be adjusted calls for proper presen-
tation by the various States of the different claims. Words may seek to restrict a de-
cision purporting to pass on a small fragment of what is in truth an organic complexity
to that isolated part. But such an effort to circumscribe what has been decided is self-
defeating. A decision has a momentum of its own, and it is nothing new that legal doc-
trines have the faculty of self-generating extension. We ought not to decide any of
these interrelated issues until they are duly pressed here by the affected States, so that
a mature judgment upon this interrelation may be reached. 333 U.S. 541, 555 (1948).
28 368 U.S. 71, 79 (1961).
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Florida,2 9 a case in which four states sought to collect death taxes based
upon the domicile of the decedent, the Supreme Court noted original
jurisdiction of the cause and pointed out that it exercised its jurisdiction
to avoid the risk of loss ensuing from the demands and separate suits of
rival claimants to the same debt or legal duty.
The decision in the Western Union case leaves the problem of multiple
escheat actions of intangible personal property in a complicated state but
not one that could not have been predicted from earlier Supreme Court
decisions. It will be necessary, in future actions such as this, for a state to
file an original action in the Supreme Court naming all of the other inter-
ested litigants, including the holder of the res and the true owner as well
as the other interested states. All claims will then have to be set forth to
the Court and it will then be up to their determination to adjudicate the
rights of the opposing parties. Such a process will no doubt entail much
expense and much time. It would seem that Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissents previously noted was quite correct in his analysis of the problem.
A better solution would seem to lie in the several states adopting the
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.80 Although this too
would take much time to enact in all the various states, its ultimate solu-
tion to the problem of multiple escheats, especially, would appear the
most logical course to follow. The Uniform Act is more realistic with re-
gard to the instant problem since among the many states which have en-
acted it into law, the state of the owner's last known residence would be
the only state able to escheat the res in contention. Certainly this satisfies
the requirements of due process of law since such a judgment of escheat
would be assured validity in all other states where the Act was in force.8 '
29 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
30 Section 10 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
10. Reciprocity for Property Presumed Abandoned or Escheated Under the Laws
of Another State.
If specific property which is subject to the provisions of sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, is held
for or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address is in another state
by a holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that state, the specific property is not
presumed abandoned in this state and subject to this act if:
(a.) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of such other state;
and
(b.) The laws of such other state make reciprocal provision that similar specific
property is not presumed abandoned or escheatable by such other state when held for
or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address is within this state by a
holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of this state.
This act has been passed in at least seven states: Arizona, California, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. In addition, the states of Florida, Mississippi,
Pennsylvania and South Carolina are considering its passage. The act was originally
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1954
and was approved by the American Bar Association the same year.
31 For a complete discussion of this problem, see 59 MicH. L. REv. 756 (1961).
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Until the time when such a Uniform Act can be put into the legislative
enactments of all the states, 2 we will have to be satisfied with the time
consuming process of having the Supreme Court3a determine the situs of
the specific property in question as well as the merits of the individual
claims presented.
a2 To see just how far a state has gone in attempting to escheat funds, see State v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959). This involved the
State of New Jersey seeking to escheat estimated dollar amounts of unredeemed S&H
trading stamps.
aa Mr. Justice Stewart dissented in the Western Union case, stating that only New
York, the state of the Company's domicile, could escheat the funds in question. It
would seem that the better view, however, according to the Uniform Act, would be
to have the funds escheat to the state of the last known residence of the owner of such
property.
LABOR LAW-STATE COURT AND REINSTATEMENT
Plaintiffs Cooper, Ritter and Williams were discharged from their em-
ployment with the defendant, Nutley Sun Printing Company, allegedly
because of their membership in Local 103 of the Typographical Union,
also a plaintiff to this action. The remaining six plaintiffs, also employees
of defendant, were ordered to have nothing to do with Local 103 and
to refrain from joining it. One of the plaintiff employees was threatened
with bodily harm if he engaged in any union strike against defendant.
In response to these threats, plaintiffs declared a strike and began to
picket defendant's place of business. A complaint was filed with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board alleging that defendant was guilty of unfair
labor practices. The Board declined to assert jurisdiction over the case
because the effect of defendant's business on interstate commerce was
not sufficient enough to warrant the Board's intervention.' Plaintiffs then
1) Non retail enterprises: $50,000 outflow or inflow directly or indirectly in inter-
state commerce.
2) Office Buildings: Gross revenue of $100,000 of which $25,000 or more is derived
from organizations that meet any of the standards.
3) Retail Concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business.
4) Instrumentalities, links and channels of interstate commerce: $50,000 from inter-
state (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed for employers in
commerce.
5) Public Utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet non-rail standards.
6) Transit systems: $250,000 gross volume except taxicabs, as to which the retail tests
shall apply.
' The NLRB ruled that the amount of business conducted by Nutley Sun Printing
Company did not come within the standards which the Board had established as of
1958. Any case which did meet the financial standards was outside the jurisdiction of
the NLRB. The standards of the Board as reported in NLRB, 23d Ann. Rep. 8 (1958)
are as follows:
